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n firms located in market 1 and m firms located in market 2 each sell a 
homogeneous commodity in both markets. Each market has its own currency. 
The market demand functions differ. When these markets are independent 
on the cost side (constant marginal costs) and demands are linear, a merger 
in market 1 increases the pass-through (of an appreciation of currency 2) in 
market 1 and decreases the pass-through in market 2. A merger in market 2 
has the opposite effect. With identical economies of scope linking the markets, 
the sign of the price changes may be reversed when the number of foreign 
firms is small enough compared to the number of local firms. However, the 




















































































































































































1 In tr o d u c tio n
Empirical evidence (see Feinberg (1986) and Fisher (1989a)) suggests that the pass- 
through of exchange rate changes (into export prices) is smaller when the exporting 
country is more concentrated. In particular, more concentrated industries lower 
their export price markup more than less concentrated industries, when there is an 
appreciation of their domestic market’s currency. The econometric results obtained 
by Feinberg (1986, 1989, 1991) also indicate that domestic prices react more to 
exchange rate changes in industries with a larger import share. These findings are 
in accordance with the theoretical results on the relationship between exchange rate 
changes and domestic prices in oligopolistic “home” markets obtained by Dombusch 
(1987) and Fisher (1989b).
This paper presents a model which allows one to simultaneously trace down 
the effects of an exchange rate change on the prices in two oligopolistic markets for 
the same commodity and to study the effect of mergers, i.e. increased concentration, 
on the pass-through in both directions. It is a generalization of Hens, Kirman and 
Fillips (1991), in which there is one firm in one market and one firm in the other 
market, each selling in the two markets considered. Here there are n firms in market 
1 and m firms in market 2 , so that the impact of mergers in one of the markets (or 
between markets) can be studied without losing the oligopolistic structure.
Studying the consequences of a merger and the resultant Cournot-Nash equi­
librium is complicated, as Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) pointed out. The 
essential problem is that a merger corresponds to the formation of a two-player 
coalition. As is well known in Game Theory, Nash equilibria are vulnerable to ob­
jections by coalitions of more than one player. Hence the coalition may lose as a 
result of forming, not since the previous outcome is not attainable but because their 
strategy would no longer be a best response to their opponents. Thus any analysis 
of a merger has to take account of the fact that the new equilibrium may be very 
different from the previous one. The route to positive results lies in limiting, by 
assumption, some of the possible changes in the equilibrium.
The model is presented in Section 2. A comparative statics analysis is then 
carried out, first under the standard assumption of constant marginal costs (Section 
3). The impact of strategic complementarity and substitutability on individual 
quantity responses in the two markets to exchange rate changes is examined in 
some detail. Then the effects of mergers on the extent of the pass- through is traced 
out. Section 4 allows for economies and diseconomies of scope linking the two 
markets. When the firms benefit from identical economies of scope, the sign of the 
price changes may be reversed: the price may go up in the market whose currency 
appreciates, or the price may go down in the market whose currency depreciates, 
depending on the relative number of firms located in the two markets. Under the 
assumptions made, the two market prices may go up or the two market prices may 
go down. Hut the perverse situation where the price goes up in the country that 




























































































2 T h e  M o d e l
Let there be two markets for a homogeneous commodity, market 1 and market 2, 
separated by barriers other than tariffs and transportation costs. Market structure 
is oligopolistic in each: there are n firms located in market 1 , selling (x,i +  i i2) 
each (i =  1 , . . .  ,n); there are m firms located in market 2, selling (z*i + zk2) each 
(* =  1 ....... "*)•
The profit function of a firm located in market 1, expressed in market 1 cur­
rency, is
where
n< =  Pi(A') Xji + ep2(Z) x i2 -  Ci(xa , xi2)
n m
(i)




Z  =  5^ Xi2 +  Zk2 =  + Z^.
i=l k=1
(2.2)
represents the sales of firm i in market 1 and x,2 represents its sales in market 
2. And similarly for zki and z*2. The inverse market demand functions are Pi{X) 
and Pi(Z), respectively. The exchange rate, e, is the worth in market 1 currency of 
the currency used in market 2. The cost functions are c, (xo, x,2) and ck (z*i, zk2), 
with marginal costs cj, cf, ck and c*. Superscripts denote derivatives with respect 
to the first, respectively second, argument. Firms located in market 2 have profit 
functions
lit =  Pi W  zti +  ep2(Z) zk2 -  eck(zku zk2) (3)
also expressed in market 1 currency.
The demand, cast and profit functions obey the following assumptions. The 
inverse demand functions Pj(X) and Pj(Z), j  = 1,2, are continuous for all X  > 
0, Z  > 0. For each market there exists X  > 0 and Z > 0 such that pi(X)  =  0 for 
all X  > X , p2(Z) =  0 for all Z > 2  and Pi(X) > 0 for X  < X ,  p2 (Z) > 0 for Z < Z. 
Furthermore, p; (0) =  pj < oo (j =  1,2) and for all X  and Z  such that 0 < X  < X  
and 0 < Z  < Z  respectively, Pi(X) and p2(Z) have a continuous second derivativep" 
with //t (X) < 0 and rf2(Z) < 0 for all X  and Z. The cost functions c,(x,i, x,2) and 
c*(z*i, zk2) are defined and continuous for all output levels Xu > 0, xi2 >  0, zki > 0 
and zk2 > 0. Ci(0,0) > 0, c*(0,0) > 0. Cj and ck have continuous first and second 
partial derivations for all Xu, Xi2, zu , zjt2 > 0. Furthermore, cj, cf, ck, > 0 for 
all Xu, xi2, zti, zk2 >  0. Finally, for all x,i, x,2, z*i, zk2 > 0, X  < X  and Z < 2. 
n<(zii, Xt2, X ,  Z) and n*(zu, z*2, X, Z) are concave.
Let us derive the first-order conditions of a Coumot-Nash equilibrium. Dif­




























































































nl(x,i,  x l2) X, Z) = p \ ( X ) x n + p i ( X ) - c l ( x u , X i 2) (4.1)
n - ( i i i ,x ,2, X, Z) = e(ft2(Z )x i2 + Pi(Z)) -  cf(xu, x i2) (4.2)
for firms i and
ni(x*i, Zk2 , X, Z) = p\(X) Zki + Pi(X) -  ec'k(zku zk2) (4.3)
n*(x*i, zk2, X ,  Z ) =  e(p’2(Z) zk2 + P2(Z) -  Jk(zki, zk2)) (4.4)
for firms k. The system of 2(n + m) equations
nf(*r„ *&, x \  r )  =  0 i  =  1 , 2; t =  1 . . . ■,«
n{(*;„ z’k2 , X ' , Z ' )  =  0 j =  1 , 2; k =  1 ,. , . , m (5)
describes the first-order equilibrium conditions, where stars denote equilibrium val­
ues of the relevant variables.1 These conditions allow one to divide (4.2) and (4.3) 
by e. A change in the exchange rate can therefore be interpreted alternatively as a 
rotation of a firm’s foreign marginal revenue curve or sis a change in the opposite 
direction of its marginal cost.
The second-order conditions imply
a,, =  pU X I x ’h + 2p',(A>) -  ciUi*,, x ’2) < 0 (6.1)
0,2 =  e(p£(Z*) x 'l2 + 2p2(Z'))  -  c f ( x \u x ’2) < 0 (6.2)
a*i =  P\{X ) zkl + 2p,(X*) — ec“ (z j,, z^2) < 0 (6.3)
ak2 = e(p%(Z’) z'kj + 2p'2(Z ')  -  cl2(z’kl, z ’k2)) < 0. (6.4)
We now introduce the following derivatives:
6„ =  p"(X’)x]i + p \(X ')  (7.1)
ba =  p'l(Z')x :2 + p'2(Z')  (7.2)
6*i =  W ) z - k l + p \{X ')  (7.3)
6*2 =  £ {Z ')z 'k2 +p'2(Z'). (7.4)
Equilibrium exists under the assumptions made (Friedman (1977)). These assumptions are 
satisfied if p' < 0, p" < 0 for both countries and ĉ ', c* > 0 for all i and k. They may still hold 




























































































An interesting interpretation was suggested by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klem­
perer (1985). Think of bn as d(d t l , /d x n ) /d x n  where j  represents firms other than 
t selling in market 1 : bn represents the change in the marginal profitability to firm i 
of being more aggressive (selling more) when competitor j  becomes more aggressive 
(sells more) in market 1. Note that bn takes the same value with respect to x‘, (j ^  t) 
and zj, for all j  =£ i and fc, 6*i takes the same value with respect to z,*,(f /  k) and 
x*j for all l ^  k and i, and similarly for bn and bin- When feu > 0, firm i regards its 
product as a “strategic complement” to the product of its competitors in market 1 . 
When bn < 0, firm i regards its product as a “strategic substitute” to the product of 
its competitors in market 1 . These signs clearly depend on the shape of the market 
demand functions and may therefore differ between markets although the commodity 
is homogeneous. Since demand in one market is independent of the price in the other 
market, there is no room for strategic substitutability or complementarity between 
markets. When demands are linear {jj[ = = 0), then bn =  6u  =  Pi(X')  < 0 and
bi2 = bk2 = <  0, so that strategic complementarity is eliminated.
3 C o n sta n t M a rg in a l C o sts
To gain first insights, we start with the standard assumption that all firms have 
constant marginal costs of production. There are no economies or diseconomies of 
scale: c*1 =  cp =  cj.1 =  c£2 =  0; there are no economies or diseconomies of scope 
between markets: cj2 =  c21 =  cj2 = c*1 =  0, for all i and k. Consequently the two 
markets are independent on the cost side, in the sense that quantities sold in one 
market do not affect the marginal cost of quantities sold in the other market, and 
each market’s equilibrium can be determined separately.
3.1 Exchange R ate Pass-T hrough
Stability conditions can also be imposed on each market separately. Such conditions 
are needed to establish the consequences of an exchange rate change. A natural 
adjustment process is to suppose that a firm will increase its sales if it obtains a 
positive marginal profit from so doing. For market 1, the adjustment process is
ill = n*(xn,.. • »̂ nl) *11» • •• > ̂ ml > *0 (8.1)
in = nj(x„,.. • j j % \ 1 ) • •• ) > c). (8.2)
Linearising around the equilibrium point z(,, . . . ,  z'mU i.e. taking
a first-order Taylor expansion, one obtains
i n
X21




Xu -  xj, 
X21 X21




























































































and similarly for market 1 . 
We have
ÛÜ =  II,11 =  6U + p[(X‘) < 0 for all t 
aki =  n i 1 =  6k, + p\{X')  < 0 for all k,
a necessary condition for stability. Another necessary condition is that the deter­
minant of the coefficient matrix in (9) should have the same sign as ( - l ) " +m. This 
determinant can be written as
n+m n+m 6 ,n K.-M
,j=i
i+E(7iV )j=i 0,1 -  6,i
Therefore
n+m n+m h .(_l)n+mn («ri. j=i i+E(r^V),= i 0,1 - 6,i > 0. ( 10)
Sufficient conditions are obtained by requiring that the coefficient matrix in 
(9) has the “dominant diagonal” property
M  > (n + m -  1) |6yiI (ID
for j  =  1....... n +  m. In conjunction with the second-order conditions, this implies
a,i + {n + m -  1) bji 
Oji -  {n + m -  1) 6,1
These inequalities in turn imply
a, l -  6,1 < 0
< 0 V o
< 0 —n d?
- A o (12)
J =  1 , .. ,n  + m. (13)
Therefore
(_l)„+m
n+mn (®ji - w > °
j=i
and ( 10) implies




























































































Similar conditions apply to market 2. Since au — bn =  p', — cjl , i = 1 , . . . , n, and 
a*i — 6*1 =  p'i -  ec£‘, A: =  1 ,m,  conditions (13) impose that the slope of the 
inverse market demand curve (expressed in home currency) be smaller than the slope 
of the marginal cost curve. When, as here, marginal cost is constant, condition (14) 
simplifies to
/9i =  l + n  +  m +  X > 0 ,  (14.1)
which restricts complementarity (occurring when p'i is positive). Condition (14) 
ceases to be restrictive when, in addition, market demand is linear (p'i = p'i = 0), 
since then
P i= ( h  = } + n  + m, (14.2)
strategic complementarity being eliminated altogether as noticed above.
We are now ready for comparative statics. Let y, = X —Xn, yk = X —zk\, g, = 
Z — 9k — Z  — z*2- Total differentiation of the first-order conditions (5) gives
0,1 dXi 1 +  bn dyt = 0 (15.1)
akt dzki + bk\ dyk =  6*i de (15.2)
0,2 dxt2 +  h,2 dg. = bade (15.3)
0*2 dzk 2 + f>*2 dgk =  0 (15.4)
where bk\ =  —11  ̂ and =  —fl^. In particular,
<5*i =  ci > 0
is the cost increase (in market 1 currency) resulting from an appreciation of market 
2 currency for firms located in market 2. Similarly,
* ,  =  - ( ! )  c?< o
is the cost reduction (in market 2 currency) resulting from an appreciation of market 
2 currency for firms located in market 1.
Rewrite (15.1) as






























































































. , b,,d i n  + -------—
0(1  —  0,1
dX  = 0.
d X  i + S(̂ )]dX  =  0.
Rewrite (15.2) as
(16.1)
akidzti +  6*i (dX  - d z ki) =  ó*i de
or
d.z*i + 6*i
(a*i -  6*i )
dX  =
Summing over fc,
d Z\ + dX  = de.








Ski 6*. r ; - (  \ 1 1
(a*i -  6*i) /M afci — 6*i) [j£ri Va*i — 6*i y _
de.
A similar aggregation procedure applied to market 2 gives
dx, 2 = 6(2 6(2 \1
































































































de. (22)d z k2 = bk2
ft(ûfc2 — &«)
Since 6*1 > 0 and 6*2 < 0 , we have





The sum appearing in d X  is over the m  firms located in market 2, whereas 
the sum appearing in d Z  is over the n firms located in market 1: the price change 
in a market is due to the quantity response of the foreign firms to the exchange rate 
shift. This response is related to the fact that an appreciation of market 2 currency 
amounts to a cost increase for foreign firms selling in market 1 (reflected in 6*i) and 
a cost decrease for firms i selling in market 2 (reflected in 6t2). These cost effects are 
weighted by the degree of aggressiveness encountered in the foreign market (1/ f t  
in market 1, l//3a in market 2). The sign of the response, however, is independent 
of the sign of 6*i, bkl, b,2 and b*2, that is, of the strategic nature of the commodity, 
since f t  > 0 and f t  > 0.
P roposition  1: An appreciation of the currency of market 2 decreases p2 and 
increases p1, when markets are independent.
This is the standard proposition in the (static) literature on the subject.
As for individual sales, we find
0 p i <O and ^ < 0  (24)
oe oe
for all i and k in the case of strategic complementarity (6,i > 0 and bki > 0). 
However, in case of strategic substitutability
> 0 and - < 0. (25)
oe oe
Indeed, since dX/de < 0, the positive quantity response of the firms located in mar­
ket 1 , which take advantage of the local price increase, must be over-compensated by 
a negative response of the foreign firms whose currency appreciates. This negative 
response results from (19) and the fact that
or
£i=l de + £
9 z k i 
de
< 0
h i  9e  h i  9e












































































































> 0 and dzkJ
de
< 0 (27)
when there is strategic substitutability. The negative quantity response of the firms 
located in the market whose currency is over-compensated by the increased sales, 
in market 2, of the foreign firms.
P roposition  2: Individual quantity responses to exchange rate changes depend on 
the strategic effect on marginal profits. In the case of strategic complementarity in 
both markets, all firms increase sales in the market whose currency appreciates and 
reduce sales in the other market. In the case of strategic substitutability in both 
markets, firms located in the market whose currency appreciates sell less in both 
markets, whereas firms located in the other market sell more in both markets. If 
there is strategic complementarity in the market whose currency appreciates and 
strategic substitutability in the other market, then firms located in the former sell 
more at home and less abroad, while firms located in the latter sell more in both 
markets. In the opposite case, the reverse is true.
It does not seem possible to derive a general result about the incomplete pass­
through of exchange rate changes into prices in oligopolistic markets. The elasticities 
of prices with respect to e are
_ _  e Pi V-
e> ~  2sPi Pi a*l _
> 0
E  — ^ 7 - < 0  
PzPz  j= i a<2 — 0i2
(28.1)
(28.2)
respectively. However, when market demands are linear, these elasticities simplify 
to
1 ( Pi ^ ^ „ n‘=  ------------- I — Z\ + m  < -------






























































































1 + n + m
1
1 + n +  m
> -1
using (14.2). Consequently
0 < £i < 1 and — 1 < £2 < 0. ( 2 9 )
With constant marginal costs and linear market demands, the pass-through is in­
complete in both directions.
3.2 M ergers
In this section, we adopt the two assumptions of constant marginal costs and linear 
demands. This puts us in the framework adopted by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
(1983): merged firms are treated as a collection of plants under the control of a 
particular player in a noncooperative game. We shall also adopt their simplifying 
assumption that all firms have equal marginal costs (c), since nothing essential is 
lost in doing so once marginal costs are constant. Note that the linearity of market 
demands implies that all firms regard their product as a “strategic substitute” to 
their competitors’ in both markets.
We first consider a merger of two firms in market 1. To see its effect on the 
pass-through, in market 1, of an appreciation of country 2, we use equation (17), 
which becomes
The sum between brackets remains unchanged since 6k\ =  c[ and ati — bm = p) 
are constant under the assumptions made. /3,M < /3, implies that the degree of 
aggressiveness is increased in market 1 ( ja  > d-), so that X M decreases more 
than X: the post-merger price pf1 increases more than p( as market 2 currency 
appreciates.
How does the same merger (in market 1) affect the pass-through in market 2? 
Equation (20) becomes
Here P2 = p ^  < /%, while the sum between brackets is reduced. Remember, 
indeed, that a ,2 — bn = p'2 and 6(2 =  — <?/e  for all i. We thus have
(30)
where the superscript M  indicates post-merger values. We have





























































































d Z  —1 ( n ( ? / e \  d Z M —1 / (n -  1 )c2/e
de l +  n + m \  p2 /  de n + m  \  p/2
since this can be written as > ~~n+£r which is always true. Z M increases less 
than Z  and p^1 decreases less than p2-
P roposition  3: A merger in market 1 increases the pass-through of an appreciation 
of currency 2 in market 1 , where the post-merger equilibrium price increases more 
than the pre-merger price, and decreases the pass-through in market 2, where the 
post-merger equilibrium price decreases less than the pre-merger price, when the 
products are strategic substitutes in two separate markets.
We next consider the effects of a merger of two firms in market 2, using equa­
tions (17) and (20) again, when the currency of market 2 appreciates. A similar 
argument gives
d X  d X M „
Ife < T < 0
since > ' n+m”1 • ' n market 1, X M decreases less than X  and pf* increases less 
than pi. However, in market 2, in which the merger occurs, Z M increases more 
simply because of the reduction in /3“ .
P roposition  4 : A merger in market 2 decreases the pass-through of an appreciation 
of currency 2 in market 1 , where the post-merger equilibrium price increases less 
than the pre-merger price, and increases the pass-through in market 2, where the 
post-merger equilibrium price decreases more than the pre-merger price, when the 
products are strategic substitutes in two separate markets.
In terms of the empirical results summarized in the introduction, Propositions 
3 and 4 are compatible with the finding that the pass-though into export prices is 
smaller when the exporting industry is more concentrated, in the sense that such 
industries lower their export price markup more than less concentrated industries, 
when there is an appreciation of their domestic currency.
What about the indication that domestic prices react more to exchange rate 
changes in industries with a larger import share? This would be compatible with our 
Propositions 3 and 4, to the extent that mergers occurring in a market increase the 
import share of that market. Under the Salant-Switzer-Reynolds assumptions made 
here, such an increase in import shares indeed occurs. In post-merger equilibrium, 
each surviving firm sells more in each of our two markets since the total number of 
firms is reduced. Each surviving firm also sells the same quantity in each market, 
since the equilibrium is symmetric in each market. However, the two merged firms 
contract their aggregate output after the merger, for any given output of the other 
firms, because they internalize the inframarginal loss that they impart to each other. 
Consequently, X M < X *, Z ^  > Z\  and X,M < Xf according to (2.1), when two 
firms merge in market 1 , and the post-merger import share Z™/ X M is larger than 




























































































Finally, we note that if a firm located in market 1 takes over a firm located in 
market 2 , the effect on ^  and on ^  is the same, under the assumptions made, as 
if the merger had been between firms located in market 2 (and vice-versa). All that 
matters is the reduction in the number of players.
4 E co n o m ie s  an d  D isec o n o m ies  o f  S c o p e  A cro ss  
M a rk ets
We now take account of the fact that each firm’s cost function may have non­
zero cross partial derivatives: selling abroad may lead to economies or diseconomies 
of scope. Economies of scope contribute positively to marginal profits, whereas 
diseconomies do the opposite. Since
n 12 =
9 2  a  _  c , 2
d x n  d x i2
n i 2 =
d 2 c k 12 
d z k x dzk2  CC*
n 21 =
d 2 C, _  c 2 ,
d x i2  d x n
n r  = 9 2  Ck -  CC2'
9  z k2 9  zki *
there are diseconomies of scope across markets if c‘2 > 0, c*2 > 0, cj1 > 0 and 
c*1 > 0. There are economies of scope across markets when these derivatives are 
negative.
4.1 Exchange R ate Pass-T hrough
Total differentiation of equations (5) gives
Oil dx„ + bn dy, -  cj2 dx ,2 = 0 
o*l dzti +bkldyk - e  c 'k2 dzk2 = 6k\de 
0,2 dx,2 +  6,2 dg, -  c21 dx„ = Si2 de 
0*2 dzk2 + 6*2 dgk -  e c f  dzkl = 0.




























































































d in  + /  6.. >| dX  - c.12 dx, 2
\a u  -  buj an — 6u
dzk\ + ^ 6*. \ dX -
e c 'k2
dzk 2
a*i — bki) a*i — 6*i
dx i2 + (  6.2 'j  d Z - c?1 dx n
\ a ,2 — 6,2 0.2 — 6,2
dZk 2 + |
' 6*2 \ d Z - eel' dzki






s  * (33.3)0.2 — 0.2
0. (33.4)
To solve this system for dX  and dZ we have to simplify matters. We suppose 
that all firms are alike, in the following sense. First we assume that c'2 =  c*2 =  c12 
and cf1 =  c*1 =  c21 for all i and k, and that
ec '2 = cl2 = c12, c21 =  ec21 =  c21 and c12 =  ec21.
The last assumption can be justified if we do local analysis of a situation in which 
the exchange rate is normalized to e =  1. Increased sales in market 2 have the same 
effect on the marginal cost of sales in market 1 for firms located in market 1 as for 
firms located in market 2, and similarly for increased sales in market 1 .
Second, we assume that 6*1 =  6*i =  6i and 6l2 =  bk2 = b2, that is, all firms 
selling in a particular market consider their product either as a strategic substitute 
or as a strategic complement.
Third, Oil =  a*i =  ai and a*2 =  a*2 =  a2t that is, the effect of increased sales 
on marginal profit is the same for all firms selling in a particular market.
Fourth, =  6\ and <5l2 =  S2. The cost disadvantage (advantage) resulting 
from an appreciation (depreciation) of home currency is the same for all firms in a 
given market.
Summing (33.1)-(33.4) over i and k under these assumptions, we obtain
and
where
7 -/? ’ d X ede
a d Z r)de
' d X 1 a  /3 ede





























































































a  = , , (n +  m)fc2 * ' . > Ü2 — t>2 7 =
(n + m) bi 





0, - 6, ’ Hi — b2
m 6 i n.62
a i ~ 6, ’ V CL 2 — 62
A = ay — Of).
To interpret (34) we need stability conditions. We can use the stability conditions 
for each market separately derived in Section 3.1. In addition we now need to take 
the two markets together and consider the profit adjustment process described by 
the system of 2(n +  m) differential equations
±n =  n* (i,i, Vi, Xij, e) 
i*i =  n i ( z tll yk, zk2, e)
i i 2 =  n j (xl2, g,, x ti , e) (35)
ikt =  n J(zM, gk, zkll e).
(increasing around the equilibrium point (i(, . . .  x ’u  ■ ■ ■ z ^ ) ,  we obtain
i l l “ 1 b. 61 . • 6, —C12 0 0 .. . 0 *11 - * i i
±21 6l a  1 61 . • 61 0 -C12 0 .. . 0 X21 -* 2 1
zml 6l 61 6 1 . • ai 0 0 0 .. • -C12 zml - 4 1
±12 -C21 0 0 . . 0 a2 &2 6 2 . . . 62 *12 -  X*2
±22 0 —C21 0 . . 0 b2 a2 62 .. • b2 *22 ~*22
0 0 0 . ■ -C21 62 62 62 ■ •• “2 2m2 ~  zm2 .
(36)
The 2(n +  m) x 2(n + m) coefficient matrix satisfies a necessary condition for 
stability that the trace be negative. We will add a condition which is sufficient 
for uniqueness and stability and therefore justifies the use of comparative statics, 
namely that the coefficient matrix (36) has the “dominant diagonal” property, or
|ui| > (n +  m — 1) |&i| +  |c12|




























































































which, together with ai < 0 and a2 < 0, implies a  > 0, 7 > 0, a\ — b\ < 0 , 
a2 — < 0 and
ai — 61 <  c12
a2 -  62 < c21. (38)
The decrease in marginal profit, corrected for strategic complementarity or substi­
tutability, must remain larger than the cost decrease due to economies of scope. 
From
A =  ^  [(“2 + (n + m -  1) 63) (ai +  (n +  m -  1) fei) -  c21 c12]
and (37) it follows that A > 0. Indeed, a2 +  (62 -f c21) < 0 implies - ( a 2 + 62) > c21
and ai +  (61 + c12) < 0 implies — (ai + 61) > c12.
We are now in a position to interpret equations (34). We have
~ -  = 4 - (ae -I- /8t7) < 0  if c12 > 0
de A
> 0  if c12 < 0, (39.1)
since a  > 0, e < 0, i) > 0, /? < 0 if c12 > 0 and /? > 0 if c12 < 0. On the other 
hand,
- =  -J- (0e +  7T)) > 0  if c21 > 0
de A
> 0  if c21 < 0, (39.2)
since 7 > 0, e < 0, 77 > 0, 0 < 0 if c21 > 0 and 0 > 0 if c21 < 0. The coefficient e 
reflects the fact that an appreciation of country 2 currency represents a cost increase 
for firms from country 2 when exporting to market 1 , whereas r; reflects the cost 
reduction for firms from country 1 when exporting to market 2. Note that both e 
and r/ appear in d X  and dZ: both affect total sales in each market. /3 and 0 
are proportional to the economies or diseconomies of scope resulting from exports 
to the other market, a  and 7 reflect the aggregate degree of aggressiveness due to 
strategic substitutability or complementarity and correspond to the coefficients fo 
and /3i defined in (14). When c"  =  c22 =  0 and P? =  P2 =  0, a  = 7 =  1 +  n -f- m.
The standard conclusion that dX /de  > 0 and dZ/de > 0 reappears when 
exports lead to diseconomies of scope (for all firms). It is the end result of a series of 
reactions. First, the appreciation creates cost (dis)advantages which make market 




























































































this is only a first explanation of the reduction in X. Because of the diseconomies, 
increased exporting increases the cost of production for local producers in market 
1. This is another reason for reducing their local sales. Reduced exports to market 
1 decrease the cost of production of market 2 firms, which therefore increase their 
local sales. The effects on local sales, in this second round, are reinforced, in a third 
round, when the commodities are strategic complements: the reduction of local 
sales by firms i further reduces the exports by firms fc; the increase in local sales 
by firms k is reinforced by a strategic increase in the exports of firms i. Strategic 
substitutability implies reactions in the opposite direction, which are not strong 
enough to prevent X  from decreasing and Z  from increasing.
These changes in X  and Z  may go in the opposite direction when all firms 
benefit from economies of scope. This sign reversal clearly depends on the impact 
of the economies on local sales, which in turn depends (all firms being alike) on the 
number of local firms. The role of n and m  in this respect will be analysed in the 
next section.
P roposition  5: On the assumption of identical diseconomies of scope for all firms, 
an appreciation of the currency of market 2 increases pi and decreases p2 if export­
ing leads to diseconomies of scope. However, p\ may decrease and P2 may increase 
if all firms benefit from economies of scope.
4.2 M arket Structure
We now examine the impact on exchange rate pass-through of changes in the number 
of firms. Changes in n or m affect the equilibrium quantities X* and Z*, which in 
turn affect the parameters appearing in dX /de  and dZ/de. Given the comparative 
statics approach followed, it would be an impossible task to trace out these effects. 
What can be done is to make the parameters, other than n and m, constant with 
respect to X* and Z*. To that effect, we suppose that the demand functions 
are linear (b\ < 0, 62 < 0) and that the second derivatives of the cost functions 
are constant. As a consequenoe, ai — 61 =  p', — c11 and «2 — 62 =  p  ̂ — c22 are 
constant. These are restrictive assumptions, indeed. In a world with economies or 
diseconomies of scale and scope, they are equivalent, though, to the assumptions 
of linearity and constant marginal costs made in Section 3.2: effects of changes in 
market concentration are reduced to effects of changes in the number of players.
Of course, the plausibility of these assumptions depends very much on the 
technologies of the firms. If each firm prior to a merger had increasing costs but 
with constant second derivatives once the merge is made and the firm can utilise 
two plants, the second derivative of its cost will change. However, in the case which 
is most interesting, that is, where there are decreasing marginal costs, the firm will 
concentrate its entire production in one of the plants and the second derivative of 
its costs will therefore by assumption be unchanged.
The second part of Proposition 5 noted that the sign of the pass-through may 
be reversed in the case of economies of scope. We now examine how such sign 




























































































Notice first that the sign of the determinant in equations (39) does not change 
with n or m. The sign of dX /de  depends on the sum ae + /Jtj and the sign of 
dZ/de  on the sum Oe + 77). We have
ae < 0, /3t7 > 0, if c12 < 0;
and
ae  < 0, 777 > 0, if c21 < 0.
d X/de  turns positive when fit] dominates ae in absolute value. However, a  increases 
with both m  and n, while 7/ increases with n and |e| increases with m. Similarly, 
d Z/de  turns negative when Oe dominates 777 in absolute value. Here, 7  increases 
with m  or n. In both markets, the sign of the effect of an appreciation therefore 
depends on the ratio 771/ 71.




a2 + (ti + 77i — 1) b2
(40)
The economic rationale is as follows. Increased exporting to market 2, as a result 
of the appreciation of currency 2, reduces the cost of production for firms located 
in market 1 , which therefore increase their local sales. Strategic substitutability 
(61 < 0) reduces imports into market 1. Nevertheless, total sales increase in market 
1 if the number of local firms (n) is large enough compared to the number of foreign 
firms (m ). In the aggregate, the effect of economies of scope then dominates the 
strategic effect.
The critical ratio m /n  decreases with |c12| and c2: the smaller the economies 
of scope or the relative cost disadvantage of foreign firms, the larger n must be 
compared to m. Mergers in market 2 make a sign reversal in market 1 more likely.
Note that (40) does not imply that market 2 must be more concentrated than 
market 1. With c2 =  c1, m  must be smaller than n only if |c12| < |a2 +  (n +  m —l)fc2|.
In market 2, a sign reversal occurs, that is, dZ/de  < 0 or (Oe +  777) < 0, if
ai +  (n +  m — l ) 6i [c2]
c21 c1
(41)
Reduced exporting to market 1, as a result of the appreciation of their currency, 
increases the cost of production of firms located in market 2. They reduce their 
local sales, which increases imports into market 2 through the strategic substitution 
effect. Nevertheless, total sales decrease in market 2 if the number of local firms 
(m) is large enough compared to the number of foreign firms. In the aggregate, the 
effect of economies of scope then dominates the strategic effect.
The smaller the economies of scope resulting from exports to market 1, and 




























































































appreciation of their currency, the larger the number of these firms must be for a 
sign reversal to occur. Now mergers in market 1 make this reversal more likely. 
With c2 =  c1, m  must be larger than n only if Ic21! < |ai +  (n + m  — 1) 6(|.
Can a sign reversal occur in both markets simultaneously? In other words, can 
(40) and (41) be satisfied simultaneously? The answer is: no. Indeed, if they were, 
then
c12 c21 > (a1 + (n + m -  1) &i) (a2 +  (n -f m  -  1) h2)
which is not compatible with the dominant diagonal property (37). Whatever 
the number of firms in the two markets, it cannot happen that pi decreases and P2 
increases, when all firms are identical in the sense defined above. To find such a 
perverse result, one has to look for differences in production technology.2 We thus 
have
P roposition  6: The price in market 1, p,, may decrease as the result of an appre­
ciation of currency 2 , if the number of local firms is large enough compared to the 
number of foreign firms, when all firms benefit from the same economies of scope 
and the commodities are strategic substitutes. The price in market 2, p2, may in­
crease under the same assumptions, if the number of firms located in market 2 is 
large enough. Such price changes cannot occur simultaneously, however.
We noted that mergers in market 2 make a sign reversal more likely in market 
1 and that mergers in market 1 make such a reversal more likely in market 2. We 
can now add that, in the event of a sign reversal, these mergers accentuate the pass­
through (in the “wrong'’ direction). Reductions in n or m  make the determinant 
appearing in (39) smaller. A smaller m  gives a smaller |oe|, so that > “  > 0,
where the superscript M  again designates post-merger values. A smaller n makes 
smaller, with the result that dz '  dz '  "d  Z ”  de
P roposition  7: The pass-through in the market where the price change, resulting 
from an appreciation, goes in the “wrong” direction, is accentuated by a reduction 
in the number of players in the other market.
What about the impact of mergers on the extent of the pass-through, when 
prices move in the “correct” direction? In the case of constant marginal costs (3.2), 
clearcut impacts could be detected. With economies or diseconomies of scope, this 
does not seem possible in the framework of our model: the extent of the pass-through 
may be reduced as well as accentuated.
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